Last week, one of the Midwest’s classic startup darlings, Dwolla, was acquired by NMI, a PE-backed fintech based in Chicago. While the details of the deal are not disclosed, I am assuming that this is a pretty good outcome for a lot of folks involved. It’s not necessarily the ideal outcome for venture investors. First of all, if it’s a banger of a valuation, that typically makes the press release, especially if you have backers like a16z, USV, and other Bay Area firms. Also, Dwolla was founded in 2011, so a 15 year investment period is tough to swallow, even for the most patient VCs. VC’s expect exits in the 7 - 10 year range, sometimes willing to go longer for better returns. It had raised close to $80M, which is not an insane amount compared to other fintech peers, but still had some heavy hitters around the table. The acquirer has some pretty big backers, like Insight and Francisco Partners and is likely worth ~$2 billion. Which means they have a lot of cash and are motivated to buy accretive assets. But it also means that they likely are not paying the same process for a bolt-on (Dwolla) as they are for the platform (NMI).
Ultimately, it’s hard to believe that this company created 100x outcomes for a lot of folks - but I am guessing there are some folks in Des Moines who made pretty good money. Now, I won’t speculate on what an employee at Dwolla who had vested shares made. Not because that’s gauche, but because that would be a fruitless effort. While this isn’t a supersonic, heat-seeking missile of an exit that VCs on the coasts would like to see (of which Dwolla had several), my guess is that it’s still a decent investment from NMI.
And, maybe most importantly, let’s not forget that the employees of Dwolla live in Des Moines, Iowa. While we could try and figure out how much people made on a transaction, what matters is whether that transaction will actually impact their lives or not.
I have personally never been to Des Moines. Nor have I ever been to the fine state of Iowa. But, I am guessing, based on my experience throughout the rest of the midwest, that it is an extremely pleasent place to live and work. And, what’s more, is that it doesn’t cost an arm an a leg just to survive there, like some of our more “desirable” metros in our country. You can stretch the dollar far futher in Des Moines than Dallas or Miami or NYC.
In Des Moines, housing is about 1/3rd to 1/4th the price in San Francisco. That means that a $100K salary is equivalent to a ~$250K salary in SF. And that’s really just accounting for housing; if you have kids, costs are also better in Des Moines than they are in SF. Put another way, assuming you are an employee in one of these locations at a tech startup that just sold and you have some vested options, the sale in SF needs to be at least 3x larger than the sale in Des Moines (AND THAT IS ASSUMING THE SAME AMOUNT IS RAISED TO HOLD FOR DILUTION - WHICH IS UNLIKELY). So a $500M exit in Des Moines is roughly equal to a $1.5 billion exit in SF.
That’s all well and good, but we don’t know how much Dwolla sold for. But let’s do an exercise just to try and get a ballpark estimate.
In the press release for the acquisition, it says “The acquisition also adds meaningful scale to NMI, creating a combined business that processes close to $700 billion in annual transaction volume. With more than 400 Dwolla customers joining NMI’s ecosystem, the acquisition strengthens NMI’s position as an embedded money movement infrastructure provider.” In January of this year, NMI stated that they were doing roughly $510 billion of transaction volume, implying that Dwolla is projected to do $190 billion in transaction volume (on their website, the current number is $82 billion, but hard to figure out the date on that figure). Of course, that is volume, not revenue, but let’s assume that they are getting some market average take rate on transaction volume for payments business, which could really be anywhere from 2 - 15 bps (0.02% - 0.15%). This would imply a revenue range from $38M - $285M. I highly doubt it’s on the high end, so let’s just say it’s somewhere in the $50-75M range. Assuming a 6x multiple, the value is somewhere in the $300M - $450M range.
I am guessing that clears the preference stack (the amount needed for venture investors to take their pro rata share of proceeds and not their preferred amount), allowing for common shareholders to participate in the liquidity event. Which means a decent payday for common shareholders, depending how much they owned.
But even if they didn’t, and this was a total wipeout transactions and common shareholders walk away with nothing, that’s not totally true either. Dwolla has meaningfully hired in Des Moines for tech talent that wasn’t necessarily being hired anywhere in Iowa. And I know it’s a cliche, but the experience that Dwolla has brought to that region is invaluable.
But it’s not just a cliche - there is clear evidence that Dwolla has made an impact from a talent perspective. There is a great blog on Startup Iowa Hot List here. The gist is that Dwolla is a key building block in helping shape the ability to Iowa founders to get companies off the ground. The companies founded directly by Dwolla alumni have now raised more than Dwolla did, a remarkable achievement in and of itself.
My favorite quote from the article:
“Dwolla became more than a startup — it became a proving ground that produced founders, community builders, investors, and operators who carried those lessons into the next generation of great companies and communities.”
But it takes more than just one to real drive a city forward. But you do have to start somewhere, and an outcome like this is very encouraging for Des Moines broadly.
Ultimately, I expect Dwolla’s impact to be more significant than just the financial outcome. But the financial outcome doesn’t hurt.
Playbook Themes
[In an effort to track and understand what makes a great midwestern company so great, I have been working to help write the playbook for Midwestern success. This involves tracking companies, like this one, and seeing what worked and didn’t work for them. Not all success stories are the same, not all plays are applied to all of the successful companies, and I am certain I am missing some of them in my current list. That’s the point of the exercise - discover what works in this part of the country. You can go to our playbook page and see a listing of all proposed strategies for success.]
There is one playbook theme that are worth analyzing in more detail: Boomerang Theory.
As a refresher, this is the theory where people leave the region to gain coastal or international experience, then return to apply these lessons locally. This is sort of the classic hero’s journey. It’s not so much about the coasts, but really going to learn from the masters.
The unique thing about Dwolla is that the founders were not boomerangs when they started the company. Most of them were Iowa locals when they started the company and built much of the team in the early days in Iowa. But then, after raising one of their early rounds of funding, their VCs asked that the management team move out to SF. To what degree this was compulsory or suggested or even Dwolla’s idea, I can’t say.
This is an old playbook from Silicon Valley VCs (and just financiers writ-large through history): they invest in a company and then tell them to move out to SF because the talent is better or the customers are there or some other dumb line of thinking. This historically has a pretty mixed track record. It used to work at one point (read: eBay), but I can’t think of a lot of examples of companies that did this effectively.
That’s not to say that people haven’t moved companies out to SF and achieved success. But what happened with Dwolla was that the company was already decently well established and had to move out to SF to tackle a P2P payments strategy that was very hot at the time.
It did not work out.
Today, there is Dwolla talent all over the country, including SF, but the HQ is very much based in Des Moines.
I am sure the management team at Dwolla learned a lot from their time in SF and would not say that it was a waste of time. But, I think it’s a good lesson broadly - if something is already working in the Midwest, feel free to hire people outside of the region, but don’t just straight up move your headquarters without an extremely strong reason why. That’s adding another painful variable into the equation of an already hard to tackle problem of starting a company.
[The one caveat around this rule is that COVID really screwed up a lot of things, including where people work. That might be the one time in recent history where this was enacted successfully.]
The other interesting thing here is that when they moved out to the Bay Area, the dream was very much around building a massive consumer business. But, again, that didn’t really work out. Instead, they pivoted / refocused on building payments infrastructure that just works.
Notice how I haven’t even really talked at all about what Dwolla does. It’s a fairly esoteric product and payments in general is opaque and insider-y. Another way of reading it is that it is boring.
I hate when people say a business is boring. You know what’s not boring? Cash flow. If this business works, it’s not boring. But there is something someone said about another successful business in the region that always sticks with me: “It was just so boring that it had to work”.
There’s a good chance that was part of the Dwolla success story as well. While everyone in the valley was chasing P2P payments, new crypto rails, stablecoins, or some other fintech platform that would rewrite our global economy and banking system, Dwolla just made a product that worked. It was likely contrarian at the time when they got started, but it wasn’t sexy. And that’s what helped them win.



